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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. The issue of whether defendant's military 
retirement pension is marital property subject to division 
is not properly before the Court, since it was not raised in 
the lower court proceedings. 
2. If this issue is properly before the Court, then 
the defendant's military retirement pension is marital 
property subject to division in Utah. 
3. The Trial Court's clarification or interpretation 
of the decree did not amount to a modification. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter is before the Court following the Trial 
Court's denial of defendant-appellant's motion seeking 
termination of payments to plaintiff-respondent under the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act (10 U.S.C. 
Section 1408). The appellant-husband requested that the 
Trial Court interpret the division of his retirement pay in 
the decree as alimony, while plaintiff-respondent took the 
position that the division of appellant's military 
retirement pay was a division of property, not an award of 
alimony. The District Court concluded that the division of 
appellant's retirement pay in the Decree of Divorce had been 
a division of marital property and not an award of alimony, 
and denied appellant's request. 
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At this point/ respondent would point out that 
appellant1s Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are 
misleading, erroneous, and argumentative. Respondent 
submits that it is improper for a litigant appearing before 
this Court to make factual assertions which are not 
supported by the record and, further, that this Court need 
not, and should not, consider any facts not properly cited 
to or supported by the record. See Golden Key Realty vs. 
Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah, 1985); Uckerman vs. Lincoln 
National Life, 588 P.2d 142 (Utah, 1978). 
In his Statement of the Case, appellant states that the 
parties stipulated and agreed prior to the divorce that 
appellant's military retirement income was not subject to 
division as marital property, but was a source of income to 
be used in determining the amount and securing the payment 
of spousal and child support. In fact, the parties entered 
into a written Stipulation and Agreement which says no such 
thing. (R., 4 and 6). 
The Stipulation was incorporated into the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R., 10), and the Decree of 
Divorce (R., 12-15). 
Appellant next asserts that the treatment of the 
military retirement pay as alimony was reaffirmed in a 
subsequent Order on Order to Show Cause (R., 33), when in 
fact the Court in that Order specifically reaffirmed that 
the alimony payment was $490.00 per month, which makes it 
entirely separate from the military retirement pay (R., 34). 
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Appellant next states that the Court amended the Decree 
of Divorce to designate defendant's military retirement 
income as marital property and denied appellant's motion to 
terminate monthly payments from his retirement income. In 
fact/ the Court ruled that defendant's military pension had 
been divided between the parties as property (R., 87; R., 
84). The only modification made by the Court in the Order 
appealed from was to change the designation of respondent's 
share qf the military pension to one-half of the disposable 
or net retirement pay instead of one-half of the gross 
retirement pay. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts, as with his Statement 
of the Case, is inaccurate, incorrect, and misrepresents a 
great deal of material which is not part of the record. For 
example, appellant refers to his "long and distinguished" 
Air Force career (nothing in the record); appellant's 
statement that Paragraph 8 of the Decree of Divorce 
specified $1,370.00 per month spousal support (a blatant 
misstatement, see R., 4-7); the statement that this amount 
was "specifically intended by the parties to cover 
plaintiff's anticipated monthly expenses" (nothing in the 
record, this is merely appellant's fanciful version); 
references to the parties discussions and negotiations (not 
part of the record); defendant reporting deductions from his 
retirement pay as alimony (nothing in the record, in fact, 
respondent did not report them as income, although that is 
-3-
not part of the record either); a reference in the middle of 
Page 5 of his brief to the fact that the parties "still 
regard defendant's military retirement pay as income" (a 
misstatement unsupported in the record); a reference that, 
following the 1984 hearing, the Court left the "spousal 
support obligation unchanged" an "reaffirmed that the 
military retired pay was being treated as income, not 
property" (the Order speaks for itself, R., 31-34). The 
Statement of Facts is replete with other factual errors and 
misstatements in addition to those noted above. Respondent 
would again request the Court to apply the doctrines 
enunciated in Golden Key and Uckerman, supra, and ignore any 
of appellant's "facts" which are not supported by the 
record. Respondent submits the following Statement of 
Facts. 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married in 1956, the same year 
defendant began his career in the United States Air Force. 
Two children were born of the marriage, one of whom is 
mentally handicapped and, at the f^ ime of the hearing from 
which this appeal arises, was still dependent upon parental 
support. Defendant subsequently retired from the U.S. Air 
Force in 1976, and began receiving his military retirement 
pension in approximately 1976. 
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In May 1983, respondent (hereinafter referred to as 
plaintiff) filed a complaint for divorce through her 
previous attorney. Plaintiff and appellant (hereinafter 
referred to as defendant) executed a Stipulation and 
Agreement dated May 13, 1983 (R., 4-8). The critical part 
of that stipulation for this appeal ,is contained in 
Paragraph 8 thereof, as follows: 
/ 
"Defendant agrees to pay, pursuant to 10 USC section 
1408, of the Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 
1/2 of USAF retired gross pay, 1/2 of which at present is 
$880, plus $490 alimony, plus $150 child support for Robert 
Jr. each per month. Said sums will be deposited to a bank 
account in the name of the Plaintiff. The amount of alimony 
may be renegotiated annually, by agreement if possible, or 
by court order if agreement is not possible, and there has 
been a substantial change in circumstances. If Robert Jr 
should become employed full time and/or become self 
supporting, child support payments shall cease. Defendant 
and Plaintiff may be ordered to supply such financial 
records as necessary at time of any renegotiations to 
substantiate any claims for adjustment of alimony or child 
support.w 
On June 28, 1983, plaintiff appeared with her 
then-attorney, presented the Stipulation to the Court, and 
the Court ordered that the terms of the divorce were to be 
as set forth in the Stipulation, with those terms to be 
incorporated into the Findings and Decree (R., 9). The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law provided that the 
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Decree should incorporate all matters stated in the 
Stipulation (R., 10 & 11), and a Decree of Divorce was 
entered on July 8# 1983, incorporating the terms of the 
Stipulation. Paragraph 8 of the Stipulation also appears, 
verbatim/ as Paragraph 8 of the Decree (R., 15). 
In February 1984, defendant filed an Affidavit and 
obtained an Order to Show Cause seeking modification 
regarding some insurance policies, child support, and 
alimony (See Affidavit of Defendant* R., 17-19). 
Plaintiff filed a Response and Counter-Affidavit (R., 
21-25), seeking, among other things, to have her half of 
defendant's retirement pay paid to her directly from the Air 
Force. An Order was subsequently entered on February 28, 
1984 (R., 31-34). In that Order, the Trial Judge dealt with 
the retirement pay in Paragraph 10, and dealt separately 
with the alimony in Paragraph 12. In the said Paragraph 12 
(R., 34), the Court refused to change the alimony, finding 
that the defendant remained able to "pay the full alimony 
ordered in the Decree of Divorce", stating that "the 
defendant shall continue to pay the sum of Four Hundred 
Ninety Dollars ($490) per month alimony to the plaintiff". 
This Order was not appealed. 
Thereafter, in November 1985, defendant filed a Motion 
with the Court seeking termination of alimony "to include 
that portion being withheld from his retired pay", and 
further seeking termination of the requirement that 
defendant maintain the plaintiff as beneficiary under some 
life insurance policies. (R., 47-48). 
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Plaintiff responded to the Motion, admitting her 
remarriage and admitting that alimony in the sum of $490 per 
month should be terminated, although affirmatively alleging 
that defendant was at that time several thousand dollars 
behind in his alimony payments, and further pointing out 
that alimony and the division of defendant's military 
retirement pay had absolutely nothing to do with one 
another. (R., 51-52). 
Since the defendant had taken the liberty to submit an 
Order to the Court terminating plaintiff's interest in 
defendant's military retirement pay, an objection to that 
Order and a Request for Hearing were also filed (R., 53), 
and plaintiff also filed her Affidavit in Support of Order 
to Show Cause and Order to Show Cause (R., 57-61). 
Defendant's Motion and plaintiff's Order to Show Cause 
were consolidated for hearing, and the plaintiff filed a 
request that the Honorable VeNoy Christofferson hear the 
matters since he had heard the original Decree of Divorce 
and the previous Order to Show Cause. (R., 60). 
The consolidated matters were heard on May 22, 1986, 
and a full transcript of that hearing is included with the 
record. At the hearing, both parties argued the matters 
before the Court, and although plaintiff offered to present 
testimony, the Court declined to hear any, stating as 
follows: 
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"I think from what I've seen that I can go on what your 
documents and orders and prior pleadings and decree are." 
(T., 33, lines 11-13). 
The parties and the Court had some further discussion 
concerning the Court deciding the matter on the record 
rather than taking testimony (T., 33-34), with the Court 
ultimately concluding that if he ran into a problem he felt 
was important enough then he would reopen the case and hear 
testimony (T., 34, lines 14-17). 
The Court entered a Memorandum Decision without 
requesting or hearing any testimony (R., 72-74)/ followed by 
an Order (R./ 83-84)/ and Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (R./ 85-90). 
The Order awarded judgment to the plaintiff for alimony 
arrearages calculated at the rate of $490 per month (R.# 
77)/ ruled that the division of defendant's military 
retirement pay "has been and shall be considered as a 
division of property, and is not and was not alimony" (R./ 
84). The Order further amended the Decree of Divorce to 
provide that plaintiff's share of defendant's military 
retirement pay should be one-half of his disposable or net 
retirement, instead of one-half of his gross retirement (R.# 
84)/ in order to comply with the provisions of 10 U.S.C., 
Section 1408. 
Defendant appeals from those parts of the Order dealing 
with the military retirement pay. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S ISSUE CONCERNING WHETHER MILITARY 
RETIREMENT PAY IS MARITAL PROPERTY SUBJECT TO 
DIVISION WAS NOT RAISED BELOW AND CANNOT BE RAISED 
FOR THE FIRST TIME BEFORE THIS COURT. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THIS COURT CHOOSES TO REVIEW THE ISSUE OF 
MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY, IT SHOULD BE TREATED AS 
MARITAL PROPERTY SUBJECT TO DIVISION IN A DIVORCE. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY INTERPRETED IT'S OWN 
DECREE, FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT'S RETIREMENT 





THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDANT'S MILITARY RETIREMENT 
PAY MAY BE TREATED AS MARITAL PROPERTY IS RAISED 
FOR THE FIRST TIME UPON APPEAL AND THEREFORE IS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
On appeal/ for the first time, defendant attempts to 
raise the issue of whether or not military retirement pay 
may be treated in the same fashion under Utah law as other 
types of retirement pay. This issue has never been raised 
at any time before the Trial Court in this matter, and 
certainly was not raised in the hearing or in the Order 
being appealed. 
In fact, the issue was stipulated to by the parties in 
their initial Stipulation. In that original agreement (R., 
4-7), the parties specifically refer to 10 U.S.C, Section 
1408, entitled the Uniformed Services Former Spouses 
Protection Act, and specifically divided the defendant's 
retirement pay half to the plaintiff and half to the 
defendant. In his Motion, defendant did not raise the issue 
of whether or not the military retirement pay was subject to 
being divided; rather, the thrust of the Motion was that the 
agreed-upon division should be construed as alimony rather 
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than property. At the hearing on May 22, the defendant's 
argument had nothing to do with whether or not the Court had 
authority to divide the military retirement pay. In fact/ 
defendant specifically stated/ in his argument/ that the 
Court did have the right to divide military retirement pay 
as marital property, stating in his argument as follows: 
"Now, had that been intended as a property settlement 
award, which under the statute which I will get to shortly 
can be done, then it would have normally appeared as a 
separate, distinct award of property. It was not done that 
way." (T./ 4/ lines 21-25). 
Mr. Richardson further stated: 
"The public law involved is the Former Spouses 
Protection Act and I would ask the Court to take judicial 
notice of it. Here is a copy of it. And initally on Page 1 
you will find that support can be awarded from this as child 
support/ alimony, and/or as a division of property. Any of 
the three can be done." (T./5f lines 9-14). 
Defendant's entire argument below was to the effect 
that the division of his retirement pay was intended as 
spousal support and not as property. Not once in these 
entire proceedings has the defendant ever raised the issue 
now raised on appeal in his Point I. 
The well-established and often cited rule of this Court 
is that matters not presented at hearing or trial in the 
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lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 
See Bundy vs. Century Equipment/ 692 P.2d 754 (Utah/ 1984); 
Trayner vs. Cushinq# 688 P.2d 856 (Utah/ 1984); Banqerter 
vs. Poulton/ 663 P.2d 100 (Utah, 1983); Park City Utah 
Corporation vs. Ensign Company/ 586 P.2d 446 (Utah, 1978). 
POINT II 
IF THE COURT HEARS THE ISSUE OF WHETHER MILITARY 
RETIREMENT PAY IS MARITAL PROPERTY/ THE COURT 
SHOULD TREAT MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY AS IT DOES 
OTHER TYPES OF RETIREMENT PAY. 
Utah law specifically provides for the equitable 
division of retirement pay# and military retirement pay 
should not be treated any differently. 
In the case of Woodward vs. Woodward/ 656 P.2d 431 
(Utah), this Court carefully and thoroughly considered the 
issue of retirement pay and how it should be treated in 
divorce actions under Utah law. In partially overruling the 
earlier case of Bennett vs. Bennett/ 607 P.2d 839 (Utah, 
1980)/ and upholding the Trial Court's award of a portion of 
the husband's retirement to the wife, the Court stated as 
follows: 
"The wife urges the adoption of the position taken by 
the California Supreme ' mrt in In re Marriage of Brown/ 15 
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Cal.3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633 (1976). There 
the court held that "[p]ension rights, whether or not 
vested, represent a property interest; to the extent that 
such rights derive from employment during coverture, they 
comprise a community asset subject to division in a 
dissolution proceeding,M Id. at 562-63, 126 Cal.Rptr. at 
634-35. This case overruled an earlier California case of 
long standing which had distinguished pension rights on the 
basis of whether the rights had vested. In the context of 
Utah law, we find it unnecessary to consider whether or not 
the pension rights are "vested or non-vested." In Enqlert 
vs. Enqlert, Utah, 576 P.2d 1274 (1978), we emphasized the 
equitable nature of proceedings dealing with the family, 
pointing out that the Court may take into consideration all 
of the pertinent circumstances. These circumstances 
encompass "all of the assets of every nature possessed by 
the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source 
derived; and that this includes any such pension fund or 
insurance." (Woodward, Page 432). 
This Court continued, in referring to pension rights, 
as follows: 
"If the rights to those benefits are acquired during 
the marriage, then the Court must at least consider those 
benefits in making an equitable distribution of the marital 
assets. 'The right to receive monies in the future is 
unquestionably...an economic resource1 subject to equitable 
distribution based upon proper computation of its present 
dollar value." (Citations omitted). Whether that resource 
is subject to distribution does not turn on whether the 
spouse can presently use or control it, or on whether the 
resource can be given a present dollar value. The essential 
criterion is whether a right to the benefit or asset has 
accrued in whole or in part during the marriage. To the 
extent that the right has so accrued it is subject to 
equitable distribution." (Woodward, Page 432-433). 
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Defendant argues that this Court has never addressed 
the specific issue of whether or not military retirement pay 
is subject to division upon the dissolution of a marriage* 
It is respectfully submitted that the issue was decided in 
Woodward, 
As this Court stated in Woodward, Utah uses a very 
broad, equitable approach in proceedings dealing with the 
family and the division of assets in a divorce case. As 
noted above, this includes all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from 
whatever source derived. 
Equity focuses upon the substance of a transaction 
rather than its form, as this Court did in the Woodward 
case. 
In the case of Linson vs. Linson, 618 P.2d 748 (Hawaii), the 
Hawaii Appeals Court considered the issue f military 
retirement pensions. In ruling that a spouse's non-vested 
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military retirement benefit constituted a part of the estate 
of the parties for purposes of division in a divorce 
proceeding, the Court considered and reviewed cases from 
several jurisdictions, some holding that military retirement 
benefits were not divisible property, and some holding that 
they were. The Hawaii Court stated; 
"In reading the opinions of courts which have passed on 
this issue we come to the conclusion that those courts which 
hold that nonvested retirement benefits are cognizable or 
divisible do so on the basis of equity, although this is 
sometimes left unsaid. Courts holding that such benefits 
are not cognizable or divisible, on the other hand, appear 
not to have considered equity at all, but to have rather 
mechanically applied rules of property law." (Linson, P 
750-751). 
Defendant cites the Court to the case of Slaughter vs. 
Slaughter, 421 P.2d 503 (Utah, 1966), in support of his 
position that military retired pay is governed by an 
entirely different set of legal principles and policies. In 
fact, Slaughter is a per curium opinion which does not even 
remotely discuss the issue of retirement pay. The Court 
simply noted in that case that the defendant received 
military retirement pay, was a retired colonel, and then 
upheld the Trial Court with absolutely no discussion of any 
af the issues in the case. 
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Defendant next provides the Court with a lengthy 
discussion of a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases, 
culminating in the recent case of McCarty vs. McCarty. 
Defendant correctly states the holding and reasoning of the 
McCarty case, but incorrectly urges the Court to adopt it as 
current law. 
The McCarty case, and everything it stands for, was 
promptly rejected and overturned by Congress through the 
enactment of Title 10 U.S.C. Section 1408, commonly referred 
to as the Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act. 
A copy of this Act is attached to defendant's brief. In 
fact, Congress specifically mads this act retroactive to the 
date of the McCarty decision (June 25, 1981) specifically to 
avoid the harsh and inequitable effect of the McCarty case 
upon divorced spouses of military personnel (Smith vs. 
Smith, 458 A.2d 711 (Delaware, 1983)). While it is true 
that each individual state may reach its own decision as to 
whether military retirement pay is a marital asset subject 
to being divided, it is difficult to see how this Court, in 
view of the Woodward decision, could equitably treat 
military retirement pay differently than any other type of 
retirement pay. 
Defendant argues to the Court that the "vast majority" 
of common law jurisdictions continue to follow the 
principles enunciated in the McCarty case, holding that 
military retirement pay is not subject to division in a 
divorce action. In support of this contention defendant 
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cites several cases decided prior to the enactment of the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act. At this 
time state courts did not have the option of deciding 
whether military retirement pensions could be divided, 
because several cases prior to the McCarty case had been 
fairly consistent in holding that the states could not 
interfere with military retirement pensions. 
Defendant cites cases from six jurisdictions, including 
Alaska, which have been decided subsequent to the Uniformed 
Services Former Spouses Protection Act. In fact, Alaska has 
now decided that military pensions are divisible property 
(See Chase vs. Chase, 662 P.2d 944 (Alaska, 1983)). 
As defendant recites in his brief, the community 
property states (8 of them) typically treat military 
retirement pay as a community asset and divide it between 
the parties. 
The following jurisdictions have held that military 
retirement pay is property subject to division in a divorce 
proceeding: Alaska - Chase vs. Chase (Supra); Arizona -
Czarnecki vs. Czarnecki, 600 P.2d 1098 (1979); California -
In re Marriage of Stenquist, 582 P.2d 96 (1978); Hawaii -
Linson vs. Linson, 618 P.2d 748 (1980); Idaho - Lang vs. 
Lang, 711 P.2d 1322 (1985); Montana - In re Marriage of 
Kecskes, 683 P.2d 478 (1984); New Mexico - Waltenkowski vs. 
Waltenkowski, 672 P.2d 657 (1983); Oregon - Matter of 
Marriage of Wood, 676 P.2d 338 (1984); Washington - In re 
Marriage of Landry, 699 P.2d 214 (1985); New Jersey -
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Castiglioni vs. Castiglioni, 471 A.2d 809 (1984); Iowa - In 
re Marriage of Schissel, 292, NW.2d 421 (1980); Missouri -
Coates vs. Coates, 650 SW.2d 307 (1983); Texas - Voronin vs. 
Voronin, 662 SW.2d 102 (1983); Illinois - re Marriage of 
Dooley, 484 NE.2d 894 (1985); Louisiana - Allen vs. Allen, 
484 So.2d 269 (1986). 
In summary, there is no logical reason to treat 
military retirement pay any differently than other type of 
retirement pay. Utah uses an equitable approach in divorce 
proceedings, and there certainly is no equitable reason for 
military retirement pay to be handled differently. At one 
time, there was indeed a legal reason, to wit, the McCarty 
case and its predecessors. Under those cases, states were 
forbidden from dividing military retirement pay. However, 
the McCarty case was quickly, thoroughly and soundly 
overruled by Congress and there is no longer any legal 
reason for treating military retirement pay differently. 
Defendant's argument that all distinctions between 
income and marital property would be lost if military 
retirement pay is to be classified as "property" was 
rejected by this very Court in Woodward. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT MODIFY THE DECREE TO CLASSIFY 
DEFENDANT'S MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY AS MARITAL 
PROPERTY AND THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION, 
Defendant argues to the Court that the Court modified 
the Decree of Divorce to classify the defendant's income as 
marital property. 
A cursory examination of the record shows that this is 
not what happened in the lower court. 
The parties entered into a Stipulation (R., 4-8), which 
in turn was incorporated into the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R., 10-11), and the Decree of Divorce 
(R., 12-15). No appeal was taken from the Decree. 
Thereafter/ in February 1984, defendant initiated a 
hearing on an Order to Show Cause in an attempt to lower or 
terminate the alimony he was paying to the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff responded, a hearing was held, and an Order was 
entered (R., 31-34). As is evident from the record, that 
entire proceeding occurred with no mention of defendant's 
new-found theory that the division of his retirement pay was 
alimony, not property. In fact, it is clear from the Order 
entered in that February 1984 proceeding that alimony was 
considered to be $490 per month, child support was 
considered to be $150 per month, leaving the division of 
retirement pay as property. 
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The record reflects substantial communication between 
the parties and their attorneys thereafter (R., 35-44), 
including two separate stipulations, neither of which deal 
in any way with the issue of retirement pay. 
In November 1985, for the first time, defendant raised 
the issue of his retirement pay, by filing a Motion seeking 
the termination of alimony, ,ftc include that portion being 
withheld from his retirement pay". J(R., 47). Other matters 
were raised in that Motion and in plaintiff's response, none 
of which are appealed. 
The Trial Court was called upon to interpret its 
Decree, not modify the same. Neither party requested nor 
presented evidence in support of modification regarding the 
issue of retirement pay. 
It should be noted at this juncture that if this Court 
feels that defendant's Motion could or should be interpreted 
as a request for modification, then the defendant failed to 
prove the necessary compelling reasons to modify as required 
by this Court in Foulqer vs. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412 (Utah, 
1981), which is quoted by the defendant in his brief. Also, 
see Land vs. Land, 605 P. 2d 124*\ (Utah, 1980), and Despain 
vs. Despain, 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah, 1980), both quoted md 
referred to in defendar brief. If defendant's Motion is 
so interpreted, then dex adant failed in his proof, did not 
meet the appropriate standard, and his appeal should be 
dismissed. 
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On the other hand, from the record it would appear that 
the parties and the Trial Court viewed the issue of 
retirement pay as one of interpreting the decree. Following 
that theory, the Trial Court heard argument from the 
parties, but did not invite or accept any testimony or new 
evidence, stating that the matter could be decided from the 
Stipulation, Decree, and on the record itself (T., 33-34). 
As this Court has stated many times, the standard of 
review in divorce proceedings is that this Court will not 
disturb a Trial Court's findings and orders absent an abuse 
of discretion. See Wiese vs. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 (Utah, 
1985); Fletcher vs. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah, 1980); 
Lord vs. Shaw, 682 P.2d 853 (Utah, 1984) - (absent an abuse 
of discretion, the Supreme Court will not substitute its 
judgment for that of the Trial Court). 
The situation presented to this Court is one of a Trial 
Court interpreting its own Decree, and finding that the 
initial Decree had divided defendant's military retirement 
pay as property. Given the advantaged position of the Trial 
Court and the standard applied to such matters (noted above) 
this Court should not overturn the Trial Judge's 
interpretation. 
The only amendment the Court made to the Decree was to 
change the division between the parties from one-half of 
gross to one-half of net. As was pointed out in the 
argument of both parties at the hearing (T., 20-22), the 
award in the Decree of one-half of the gross retired pay 
exceeded the amount allowed by Congress in 10 U.S.C. 1408. 
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Both parties agreed that the Decree should read "net" rather 
than "gross" (T.f 20/ lines 6-7). 
In addition, the parties at the hearing in effect 
stipulated to the amendment changing "gross" to "net". On 
Pages 34, 35 and 36 of the transcript/ the parties and the 
Court enter into a discussion concerning how to calculate 
the alimony arrearage. The discussion centered around 
whether or not Mr. Greene had overpaid plaintiff her portion 
of his pension during a time period when he was still 
receiving a full pension and then turning half of it over to 
her. Defendant's attorney indicated that the parties could 
"stipulate to what those figures are once we get his (the 
Court's) ruling. You have the numbers and I do. We should 
be able to work it out. We don't know what they are." 
(T./ 34-35). 
Also see Page 35 of the transcript/ lines 4 through 10 
and Page 36 of the transcript/ lines 12-25. 
Thus, there was agreement between the parties to modify 
the Decree so that the division of defendant's retirement 
pay was based upon his net retirement pay rather than his 
gross retirement pay. 
During the hearing, it became apparent to the Court and 
all parties that it was necessary to amend or modify the 
Decree to provide for a division of fhe retirement pay on a 
net basis rather than a gross basis. The Court modified the 
Decree accordingly. .V though the Court did not specifically 
make any findings or statement concerning the basis of its 
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authority to do so, it is apparent that the Court may modify 
its own Decree. In addition, Section 30-4a-l of the Utah 
Code provides that the Court may enter nunc pro tunc orders 
in divorce cases. Although the Court in this case did not 
base its modification or change upon this statutory 
authority, it is respectfully submitted that the Court could 
have done so. 
Also, Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides for correcting or altering judgments for various 
reasons. Subdivision 5 of that rule provides that a final 
judgment may be altered if the judgment is void, while 
Subdivision 7 provides that a final judgment may be altered 
for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment. 
Although this particular section was not invoked by the 
Court or any of the parties in the proceeding below, it 
would appear that the portion of the judgment granting 
one-half of the defendant's gross pay to plaintiff was 
either void or beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, and 
could be corrected pursuant Subdivision 5 or Subdivision 7 
of Rule 60(b) to read net pay. 
In his brief, defendant argues that the Stipulation 
should be construed strictly against the plaintiff, since 
the attorney representing her prepared the Stipulation and 
presented it to the Court. This same argument was presented 
by the defendant at the hearing. While that type of 
reasoning may be accurate when parties are litigating a 
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contract^ it is not applicable in this case. The parties 
here are asking the Court to interpret a Decree of Divorce/ 
not a stipulation. The Decree was entered by the Court, and 
the Court certainly has the authority to interpret it when 
presented directly with the issue. 
Defendant further argues that "plaintiff must not be 
permitted to obtain a property interest in defendant's 
military retired pay three (3) years after she relinquished 
all such interest." (Appellant's brief, page 25). 
Plaintiff made no such relinquishment, and it is clear that 
the Court interpreted the Decree, and made no amendment 
granting the plaintiff a property interest. The only 
amendment made was to correct an obvious error, to wit, the 




Defendant's contention that military retirement pay 
should not be divisible under Utah law is improperly raised 
for the first time on appeal. Even if this Court considers 
the issue, the Woodward case clearly applies and the 
retirement pay was properly divided. The lower court 
correctly interpreted its own decree and then modified only 
one small portion of that decree. Any modification was 
proper. 
Under well-established guidelines, this Court is not in 
a position to disturb the lower court ruling. There was no 
abuse of discretion, no unfairness and no inequitable 
treatment of the defendant. The defendant bargained for a 
division of his pension as property of the parties and now 
desires to be relieved of that bargain. The initial 
settlement and decree were fair and equitable to both 
parties, and should stand as interpreted by the Trial Court. 
DATED this zx day of C^ /t9hz////Z&r/Sn 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BUNDERSON & BARON 
Jon^J. Bunderson 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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